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Abstract
We study experimentally an over-the-counter (OTC) market mechanism that distinguishes itself
from the standard double-auction (DA) mechanism by an important informational feature: in the
DA setting traders post their bids and asks publicly, while in our OTC market each agent looks for
the best counterpart through bilateral and private offers, and only the prices of closed transactions
are made public. Although in many actual markets negotiations and transactions occur on a private,
bilateral basis, OTC markets have not been previously studied in the experimental literature. We
find that the lack of public information that characterizes our OTC mechanism with respect to a
DA mechanism induces an efficiency loss. We also show that this efficiency loss is due to the fact
that, in the OTC mechanism, closing prices converge to a price below the competitive price and
the traded quantity is lower than the competitive quantity. This situation generates the so-called
intra-marginal inefficiency. Finally, we investigate the efficiency and convergence properties of the
OTC mechanism when demand or supply shocks modify the competitive equilibrium. Among other
things, we show that shocks increasing the competitive quantity improve the OTC’s efficiency, and
we clarify the causes of this phenomenon.
JEL classification: C92, D41, D47, D83.
Keywords: Market experiments; Over-the-counter market; Double auction; Private vs. public
information; Efficiency.
1. Introduction
Experimental economists have studied the functioning and equilibrium properties of different
market institutions for more than half a century. In particular, they have devoted a great deal
of attention to the double-auction (henceforth DA) market introduced by Vernon Smith (1962).
In a DA market, buyers and sellers trade a single homogeneous good. Buyers can submit public
bids for the good and are free to accept asks from sellers, while sellers can submit public asks and
are free to accept bids from buyers. When a buyer accepts an ask, or a seller accepts a bid, a
public transaction takes place at the accepted price, and both the bid and ask are removed from
the market.
Because different units of the commodity are (typically) traded at different prices, and traders
are price makers, DA markets are not competitive markets. However, Smith (1962) found that
transaction prices and exchanged quantity quickly converge to the competitive price and quantity,
and the efficiency reached by DA markets closely approximates that reached by competitive mar-
kets. Moreover, as shown also by subsequent experimental research, the convergence and efficiency
properties of DA markets are robust to modifications in the number of buyers and sellers, in their
redemption values for the good, as well as in the number of units of the good they can buy or sell
(for a review of the experimental research on DA, see Friedman and Rust, 1993).
Since the late 1970s, Smith and other experimental economists have explored the question of
whether the convergence and efficiency properties displayed by DA markets are shared by other
mechanisms. In particular, this literature has focused on other auction mechanisms such as the
posted offer auction, in which sellers submit asks and buyers can purchase at the posted prices, or
the clearing house auction, where buyers and sellers submit their bids and asks to a clearing house,
and all units are sold at the price that clears the market. The basic outcome of this research is that
other auction mechanisms also tend to converge to the competitive outcome, but they are generally
less efficient than DA, and their convergence and efficiency properties are less robust than those
of DA to minor modifications in the experimental design (for reviews of this literature, see Holt,
1996 and Cason and Friedman, 2008).
In the present paper we explore the convergence and efficiency properties of a trading mechanism
that is not an auction, but is similar to the DA mechanism under many other respects. Ours is an
over-the-counter (henceforth OTC) decentralized mechanism in which, as in the DA setting, buyers
and sellers are price makers and trade a homogeneous good, different units of the good are typically
traded at different prices, and no clearing house exists in the market. However, while in DA markets
buyers and sellers post their bids and asks publicly, this public-information element is absent from
our OTC market. In our OTC market, each agent looks for the best counterpart through private
bids and asks, i.e. by making/receiving one offer at a time to/from a single counterpart. If the offer
is accepted, the transaction is carried out, and the closing price is made public, a rule that may
be labelled as post-trade price transparency. However, and differently from the DA setting, the
history of asks and bids that led to that transaction remains private information. Also if the offer
is withdrawn, and again in contrast to the DA setting, the offer and the fact that it was withdrawn
remain private information between the two counterparts.
If regarded in historical perspective, our OTC mechanism is very similar to that investigated
by Edward Chamberlin (1948) in a seminal contribution to the experimental literature on market
institutions. Chamberlin implemented a classroom market where students could roam freely around
the room and engage in bilateral and private bargaining. However, there are three main differences
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between Chamberlin’s setting and ours. First, Chamberlin did not always make public the price of
closed transactions, while we always implement post-trade price transparency. Second, Chamberlin
let experimental subjects trade for one single market period while we follow Smith (1962) and
subsequent standard practice in experimental economics, and allow experimental subjects to trade
for several periods so that they can gain experience about how the trading mechanism works. Third,
in Chamberlin’s classroom the bargaining between a buyer and a seller was conducted orally, so
that buyers and sellers physically close to the bargainers could learn their bids and asks. In our
setting, these informational spillovers are ruled out by the fact that traders interact via computer,
and the screen and keyboard of each subject’s computer cannot be seen by other subjects.
It is important to explore this OTC mechanism for it has significant economic applications. In a
large number of actual markets, negotiations and transactions occur on a bilateral basis rather than,
as happens in auction markets, through publicly posted bids and asks. Many types of government
and corporate bonds, real estate, currencies, and bulk commodities are typically traded over the
counter. In a number of these OTC markets, such as those for US corporate and municipal bonds,
financial regulators have mandated post-trade price transparency, often implemented through a
program called Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) (for a thorough discussion of
OTC markets, see, e.g., Duffie et al., 2005, Ang et al., 2012, Duffie, 2012). But despite the economic
relevance of OTC markets, we are not aware of any other experimental studies that have explored
the convergence and efficiency properties of an OTC mechanism and compared them to those of
the standard DA mechanism. Our paper fills this lacuna.
More specifically, we ran a series of classroom experiments involving more than 2400 under-
graduate students of almost the same age over a period of four years (from 2009 to 2012) in order
to investigate whether, in an OTC market, transaction prices and exchanged quantity converge to
their competitive levels, and how the efficiency reached by an OTC mechanism compares to that
reached by the DA mechanism.
Our (natural) research hypothesis was that the information disadvantage of the OTC mecha-
nism, where only closing prices are made public, over the DA mechanism, where the entire history
of asks and bids is public information, makes OTC markets less efficient than DA markets. Our
experimental data validate this research hypothesis: the OTC market is less efficient than the DA
market. We take as an index for efficiency the ratio between the surplus actually realized from
trade and potential surplus. We find that in DA markets the average efficiency index is 95.5%,
while in OTC markets the efficiency index is 86.7%. Thus the information gap between the OTC
and the DA settings determines a loss of efficiency of almost 9%.
To better understand how the lack of information about the history of asks and bids affects
negatively the efficiency of the OTC mechanism, we study the pattern of trading prices and traded
quantity in both the OTC and the DA setting. We find that, because of its informational features,
in the OTC mechanism trading prices converge to a price that is below the competitive price. This,
in turn, implies that the traded quantity is lower than the competitive quantity, which is the main
source of the OTC’s inefficiency.
We bring the analysis further: we decompose the loss of efficiency associated with both the OTC
and DA mechanisms into two main components - intra-marginal inefficiency and extra-marginal
inefficiency - and show that, while the inefficiency associated with the DA mechanism is almost
completely of the extra-marginal type, the inefficiency of the OTC mechanism is an even mixture
of both types.
Finally, to deepen our comprehension of the OTC mechanism, we introduce shocks into the
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picture and study how efficiency in the OTC and the DA mechanisms is affected by different
types of shocks, that is, by shifts in either the demand curve or the supply curve that modify
the competitive equilibrium. We find that, in the short run, shocks that decrease the competitive
quantity do not affect substantially the efficiency of the OTC mechanism, while shocks that increase
the competitive quantity significantly raise the efficiency of the OTC markets. In the final part of
the paper we clarify the causes of this phenomenon.
2. Experimental Design
Our experiments rely on a design that follows Smith (1962), in that valuations and costs are
exogenously given, and Cason and Friedman (1996), in that subjects are allowed to trade only
one unit per period. We have two main treatments, DA and OTC. In both of them subjects are
randomly assigned the role of either buyer or seller. A single homogeneous good can be bought or
sold during a given number of periods of finite length. Each buyer (seller) is assigned a redemption
value for the single unit of the good he/she has to buy (sell). By sorting individual valuations
from the highest to the lowest, and costs from the lowest to the highest, we obtain a demand and
a supply curve, respectively. The competitive-equilibrium price and quantity are determined by
the intersection of these two curves. In both treatments a feasibility constraint is imposed: buyers
cannot bid over their own valuation, and sellers cannot ask under their own cost.
Two main features distinguish the DA from the OTC treatment. First, as already mentioned,
in the DA setting buyers and sellers post their bids and asks publicly, so that the bid-ask history
of the market is common knowledge. In the OTC setting, by contrast, each agent looks for the
best counterpart through private bids and asks, and only the prices of closed transactions are made
public. Second, in the DA mechanism the bid/ask improvement rule holds. In a DA market every
agent is informed about the highest bid and the lowest ask existing in the market. The bid/ask
improvement rule imposes the stipulation that, to make a valid offer, an agent has to improve on
the existing situation: a buyer has to submit a bid higher than the current highest bid, and a
seller has to submit an ask lower than the current lowest ask. When a buyer and a seller reach an
agreement, they exit the market, the standing bids and asks are removed, and new bids and asks
can be submitted. With the OTC mechanism, however, the bid/ask improvement rule does not
hold: the agents do not observe the best bid and ask present in the market, and can also replace
their current bid (ask) with a lower (higher) one.
We ran computerized classroom experiments implementing this design through the z-Tree soft-
ware (Fischbacher, 2007). Sessions were held at Bocconi University, Milan, during a first-year
introductory course in Microeconomics over four consecutive years, from 2009 to 2012, always in
October (first semester). About one third of enrolled students per year were involved in the exper-
iments, i.e. 2416 students as a whole. The four cohorts of participants have been homogeneous in
many features: age (almost all students being 19 or 20 years old), gender (45% female), nationality
(around 80% Italians), and field of study (all were students in economics). We kept the number of
traders essentially constant (40 subjects) across the 60 experimental sessions we ran.1 The traders
were divided equally into buyers and sellers (20 buyers and 20 sellers for each session). We ended
up holding 30 sessions for the DA treatment with a total of 1204 subjects; and 30 sessions for
1To be precise, in 48 sessions we had 40 subjects, in 10 sessions we had 42 subjects, and in 2 sessions we had 38
subjects.
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the OTC treatment with 1212 subjects in total. All classroom experiments were run by the same
experimentalist (G. Attanasi), who is also one of the authors of this paper.
Each experimental session consists of six market periods of equal clock time length, namely 120
seconds per period. The six periods are partitioned into two phases, with each phase consisting of
three periods and lasting 360 seconds each, that is, 6 minutes per phase. Subjects are informed
about the existence of a second phase only at the end of the first phase.2
At the beginning of each phase, subjects are given three pieces of information: their ID, their
role (either buyer or seller) and their redemption value. Neither in the DA treatment nor in the
OTC treatment do subjects know about the distributions of valuations and costs in the market.
While their role and redemption value remain equal until the end of the phase, their ID changes at
every period. This prevents subjects from identifying trading counterparts in a given period on the
basis of IDs learned in previous periods. Every seller owns only one unit of the good and his/her
cost sets the minimum amount he/she can cash in for that unit. The buyer’s valuation sets instead
the maximum amount he/she can spend for one unit of the good. The subject’s redemption value
is private information and it always appears on his/her screen. At the end of the first phase, roles
are kept constant while redemption values are reshuffled. Therefore, in the second phase a given
subject might have a different redemption value.
In the DA treatment, bids and asks are public information, every buyer (seller) is always
informed about the best bid (ask) on the market, and the bid/ask improvement rule holds. Once
an offer is accepted, the closing price appears on every subject’s screen. In the OTC treatment,
a subject can send an offer to a single counterpart, by indicating the amount of the offer and the
counterpart’s ID. Only one offer can be submitted at a time. If the offer is accepted, the closing price
appears on every subject’s screen. If the counterpart does not reply, the offer may be withdrawn
and a new offer can be made that differs either in terms of the amount, the counterpart’s ID or
both.3 However, bids and asks submitted to a specific subject are not publicly disclosed, and no
bid/ask improvement rule holds.
At the end of each period, and for both treatments, each subject sees on the screen his/her
payoff as the difference between valuation and closing price - if he/she is buyer - or between closing
price and cost - if he/she is seller. If a subject does not trade his/her commodity unit within
the period, his/her payoff is equal to zero. Being in a classroom experiment, subjects are not
remunerated for their participation in the experiment. However, we give them an incentive to play
fairly: at the end of each of the two phases, subjects are ranked according to their total profit in
that phase.4 We then ask the four subjects having earned the highest and lowest total profit in
2In order to rule out the possibility that our experimental outcomes might be modified by further learning on the
part of the subjects, we ran a shorter third phase still consisting of three periods but lasting only 3 minutes in total
(again, this third phase was announced only at the end of the previous one). The outcomes of the third phase, which
are available upon request, are substantially identical to those of the second phase. This makes us confident that our
results do not change when subjects gain more experience, and allows us to focus on the first two phases only.
3If a subject receives more than one offer at a time, those offers are automatically ranked, so that the best deal
always appears on the top of his/her screen.
4Profits are in fact corrected: since redemption values are assigned randomly, subjects who are less lucky would
be penalized. Therefore, we implement a correction factor that, for buyers, is proportional to the distance between
their valuation and the highest valuation in the market and, for sellers, is proportional to the distance between their
cost and the lowest cost in the market. Before the beginning of the experiment, subjects are informed about the way
profits will be corrected.
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that phase to stand up. The former are praised publicly for their performance. The latter instead
may be flouted by classmates.
In order to get deeper insights about the OTC mechanism, we introduce shocks into the picture
and study how efficiency in the DA and the OTC mechanisms is affected by shocks. Subjects are
not given any information about shocks, which are defined as shifts in either the demand or the
supply curve that lead to a change in the competitive quantity q∗ and the competitive price p∗. In
40 experimental sessions (that is, 2/3 of the overall sessions) we apply shocks to either demand or
supply for both the DA treatment (20 sessions) and the OTC treatment (20 sessions). In all these
sessions, a shock occurs in period 4 and is maintained during periods 4− 6.
We implement four different types of shocks (5 sessions for each type of shock, per treatment):
1. a positive (upward) shift of demand, indicated as D+ and leading to an increase of both q∗
and p∗;
2. a negative (downward) shift of demand, indicated as D− and leading to a decrease of both
q∗ and p∗;
3. a positive (downward) shift of supply, symbolized by S+ and determining an increase of q∗
and a decrease of p∗;
4. a negative (upward) shift of supply, symbolized by S− and determining a decrease of q∗ and
an increase of p∗.
Table 1 summarizes our experimental design by indicating the absolute number of sessions we
ran for each type of treatment (DA and OTC), without shock and for each type of shock (D+,
D−, S+, S−).
Table 1: Number of sessions for each treatment.
No Shock D+ D− S+ S−
DA 10 5 5 5 5
OTC 10 5 5 5 5
3. Results
The basic measure we use to compare the performance of DA and OTC markets is the efficiency
index as defined in Gode and Sunder (1993), that is, the ratio between the total surplus actually
realized from trade and potential surplus. The efficiency index goes from 0 (minimal efficiency) to
100 (full efficiency), and the higher the index value the more efficient the market. The efficiency
index, however, says nothing about the causes of the inefficiency. To better understand these
causes, we study the pattern of trading prices in the DA and OTC markets, and compare the
quantity actually traded in these markets with the competitive quantity. Moreover, following Rust
et al. (1993), we decompose inefficiency into two main components: intra-marginal inefficiency and
extra-marginal inefficiency, both of which we will illustrate shortly.
We compare the relative performance of DA and OTC markets starting from the treatment
without shocks, and we then introduce shocks, which are applied at the beginning of the fourth
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market period, that is, in the first period of phase 2. In order to facilitate comparison between the
treatments without shocks and with shocks, we report results for the entire experimental session
(periods 1− 6) and for periods 1− 3 and 4− 6, separately.5
3.1. OTC and DA without shocks
Table 2 reports the efficiency index for the DA and OTC markets respectively. The informa-
tional advantage of the DA over the OTC mechanism is due to the fact that in the former the
entire history of asks and bids is public information, while in the latter only the closing prices are
made public. As expected, this makes the DA market more efficient, on average, then the OTC
market. More precisely, over periods 1 − 6 we observe an average efficiency index of 95.5 in the
DA market, and an average efficiency index of 86.7 in the OTC market.6 Thus the informational
disadvantage of the OTC mechanism compared with the DA mechanism determines a significant
loss of efficiency of almost 9%.
Table 2: Efficiency index, with no shocks
Periods
1− 6 1− 3 4− 6
DA 95.5 94.7 96.3
OTC 86.7 83.3 90.1
As has been already shown in other experimental studies (see Cason and Friedman, 1996, and
references therein), experience in market experiments, i.e. learning, increases the efficiency of a
market institution. This is true, in particular, for the OTC market, where efficiency increases by
almost 7% in passing from periods 1− 3 to periods 4− 6. This result is interesting by itself: in the
OTC market, learning partially offsets the relative lack of information.
Higher inefficiencies in OTC markets may come from two sources: the actually traded quantity
q can be different from the competitive quantity q∗; and/or trading prices may converge to a price
that is different from the competitive price p∗.
Table 3 reports the difference between q and q∗. The study of this difference gives us important
information about the causes of the inefficiency of a market institution. If q < q∗, then profitable
trades between some intra-marginal buyer, i.e. a buyer with a valuation higher than the competitive
price, and some intra-marginal seller, i.e. a seller with a cost lower than the competitive price, have
not taken place. If q > q∗, then some units that should have remained out of the market have instead
been exchanged: either some extra-marginal buyer, i.e. a buyer with a valuation lower than the
competitive price, managed to buy from an intra-marginal seller, or some extra-marginal seller, i.e.
a seller whose cost is higher than the competitive price, managed to sell his/her unit to an intra-
marginal buyer, or both. Notice that exchange between two extra-marginal traders is impossible:
extra-marginal buyers have valuations below the competitive price, while extra-marginal sellers
have costs above the competitive price.
In the DA market, q < q∗ in only 12% of all market periods. This result is consistent with
existing experimental evidence about DA (see, e.g. Gode and Sunder, 1993, Cason and Friedman,
5All data and instructions are available upon request.
6The results we have obtained for the DA market are in line with the findings of Gode and Sunder (1993), and
Cason and Friedman (1996).
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Table 3: Traded quantity q vs competitive quantity q∗, with no shocks.
Periods 1− 6 Periods 1− 3 Periods 4− 6
q < q∗ q = q∗ q > q∗ q < q∗ q = q∗ q > q∗ q < q∗ q = q∗ q > q∗
DA
12% 39% 49% 9% 54% 37% 15% 24% 61%
OTC
70% 18% 12% 76% 12% 12% 64% 24% 12%
1996), and appears to be due to the informational features of the DA mechanism: since in these
markets the current highest bid and the current lowest ask are public information, it is easier for
intra-marginal buyers (who have higher valuations than extra-marginal buyers) and intra-marginal
sellers (who have lower costs than extra-marginal sellers) to propose deals that can be accepted by
an intra-marginal counterpart. Thus, the DA mechanism facilitates profitable exchanges between
intra-marginal traders, and accordingly only rarely (12% of the time) delivers a traded quantity
lower than the competitive quantity.
By contrast, in the OTC market q < q∗ in 70% of all market periods. Our explanation for this
result is that, because in OTC markets negotiations are conduced on a one-to-one basis and market
time is limited, it is easier for intra-marginal traders to miss the possibility of closing a profitable
transaction. To reinforce this explanation, notice that, when traders become more experienced,
the percentage of periods for which q < q∗ decreases: in periods 1− 3, it is 76% on average, while
in periods 4 − 6, it is 64% on average. This corresponds to an increase in efficiency of the OTC
mechanism, as reported in Table 2.
The result that in the OTC market q < q∗ can be related to the pattern of closing prices. If
the market converges to an equilibrium where the average price is below (above) the competitive
price p∗, intra-marginal sellers (intra-marginal buyers) - who in a competitive market would have
sold (bought) a unit of the good - are left out of the market. This, in turn, reduces the quantity
exchanged and generates inefficiencies.
We therefore take a closer look at the pattern of closing prices and their convergence to the
equilibrium7. In the left panel of Figure 1, we draw the pattern of closing prices over periods 1− 6
for a single DA experimental session, while on the right panel we do the same for a single OTC
session. In both panels, the units traded are plotted in abscissas according to the order in which
they have been traded (the first unit traded comes first on the abscissas line, the second unit comes
second, etc.), while the prices corresponding to each traded unit are plotted in ordinates. In both
panels, the dashed line corresponds to the competitive price, while the continuous line expresses
the average closing price in, respectively, the DA and OTC experimental sessions.
In the first place, we notice that price convergence occurs in both markets. However, in the DA
treatment the average closing price almost coincides with the competitive price (the continuous
and dashed lines are superposed). In contrast, in the OTC treatment the average closing price is
clearly below the competitive price.
This pattern of closing prices does not characterize only the specific DA and OTC experimental
7For the sake of clarity and simplicity, we focus on a graphical analysis of convergence. More detailed statistical
tests are available upon request.
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Figure 1: Closing price patterns in a DA market (left panel) and an OTC market (right panel) when there is no
shock on the market. The dashed line indicates the competitive price. The continuous line indicates the average
closing price.
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sessions represented in Figure 1, but holds for all the DA and OTC experimental sessions over the
last three periods, when price convergence is most likely to occur. This is shown in Figure 2, where
we report the histogram of the relative deviations from the competitive price for periods 4-6 of all
experimental sessions. We plot the histogram of ∆p∗i = (pi − p∗)/p∗, where pi is the closing price
of unit i and p∗ is the competitive price only for the last three periods.
In Figure 2(a), we report the histogram of ∆p∗i for the DA treatment. Although this distribution
is slightly skewed on the left, it is roughly centered around 0. This confirms that, over all DA
sessions, the closing prices converge to p∗. In contrast, the histogram for the OTC market - Figure
2(b) - shows that relative deviations of closing prices are almost normally distributed and that
their mean is slightly below 0. This confirms that, even when we consider all OTC experimental
sessions, the closing prices converge to a price below the competitive price. This, in turn, implies
that some intra-marginal sellers are left out of the market, that the exchanged quantity remains
lower than the competitive quantity, and that inefficiencies emerge.
We can bring the analysis even further. To understand and compare better the sources of the
inefficiencies in the DA and OTC markets, it is useful to decompose the loss of surplus generated
by these two market mechanisms into intra-marginal inefficiency and extra-marginal inefficiency,
two notions introduced by Rust et al. (1993). There is intra-marginal inefficiency (henceforth IM-
inefficiency) when two intra-marginal traders do not exchange. Extra-marginal inefficiency (EM-
inefficiency), by contrast, occurs when an extra-marginal trader exchanges with an intra-marginal
trader.
There is a somewhat tricky relationship between IM-inefficiency, EM-inefficiency, the traded
quantity q, and the competitive quantity q∗. First, IM-inefficiency decreases the traded quantity: if
two intra-marginal traders do no exchange, q is lower than q∗. EM-inefficiency, by contrast, either
does not modify q or increases it. To see why, recall that exchange between two extra-marginal
traders is impossible. Thus, an extra-marginal trader always exchanges his/her commodity unit
with an intra-marginal trader, and in so doing he/she displaces some intra-marginal trader and
the latter’s commodity unit. Two things may happen to a displaced intra-marginal trader: he/she
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Figure 2: Histograms of the absolute relative deviation of closing prices from the equilibrium price, periods 4− 6 in
DA (left panel) and OTC (right panel).
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may be unable to trade his/her unit, in which case the quantity q traded on the market does not
change; otherwise, he/she may find another extra-marginal trader with which he/she can exchange
his/her unit and in this latter case q increases. To complicate the picture, when q < q∗, both IM-
inefficiency and EM-inefficiency can be present. For instance, imagine that intra-marginal buyer B1
and intra-marginal seller S1 are unable to trade: this decreases the traded quantity and generates
IM-inefficiency. However, at the same time, intra-marginal buyer B2 trades with extra-marginal
seller S3 who “bumps” intra-marginal seller S2: this creates EM-inefficiency but does not modify
the traded quantity, which remains lower than q∗.
We can summarize the relationships between IM-inefficiency, EM-inefficiency, q and q∗ as fol-
lows:
1. if q > q∗, the only source of inefficiency is EM-inefficiency;
2. if q = q∗ and actual surplus equals potential surplus, the inefficiency equals 0: all intra-
marginal traders have traded their unit and all extra-marginal traders are out of the market;
3. if q = q∗ but actual surplus is lower than potential surplus, then the existing efficiency is
certainly due to EM-inefficiency. IM-inefficiency is ruled out because q is not smaller than q∗;
4. if q < q∗, we certainly have IM-inefficiency, but we may also have EM-inefficiency.
Based on our data - that include the redemption values of all traders, the competitive price
and quantity, the potential surplus, the closing prices of all traded units, and the quantity actually
traded - we can decompose the loss of surplus associated with the DA and OTC markets into their
IM-inefficiency and EM-inefficiency components. Table 4 reports the results of our inefficiency
audit.
We find that in the DA market IM-inefficiency accounts for only 8% of total inefficiency, while
EM-inefficiency accounts for the residual 92% percent. This is congruous with the data displayed
in Table 2, which show that in DA markets the traded quantity q is lower than the competitive
quantity q∗ only 12% of times (remember that we have IM-inefficiency, possibly associated with
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Table 4: Sources of inefficiency by treatment with no shocks over periods 1-6 (in percentage over total inefficiency).
Periods 1− 6
EM-inefficiency IM-inefficiency
DA 92 8
OTC 54.2 45.8
EM-inefficiency, only when q < q∗). In the OTC setting, by contrast, we have a mixture of IM-
and EM-inefficiency: on average across all sessions, IM-inefficiency accounts for about 46% of the
total market inefficiency. Again, this finding is consistent with the data of Table 3 according to
which in OTC markets q is lower than q∗ 70% of the time.
Result 1. The OTC mechanism is, on average, less efficient than the DA mechanism. The
efficiency loss due to informational disadvantage of the OTC mechanism can be quantified at around
9%.
This efficiency loss is due to the fact that in the OTC mechanism closing prices converge to a
price below the competitive price p∗ and that, accordingly, the traded quantity q is lower than the
competitive quantity q∗. This situation leaves some intra-marginal traders out of the market and
generates a significant level of IM-inefficiency.
3.2. Introducing shocks
In order to grasp better the functioning of the OTC mechanism, we introduce shocks into the
picture and study how the efficiency of the OTC and the DA mechanisms is affected by shocks.
Recall that, in our design, shocks are shifts in either the demand or the supply curve that lead to
a change in both the competitive quantity q∗ and the competitive price p∗. They occur in period 4
and are maintained during periods 4− 6. We implement four types of shock: D+, which increases
q∗ and p∗; D−, which decreases q∗ and p∗; S+, which increases q∗ but decreases p∗; and S−, which
decreases q∗ and increases p∗.
Table 5 reports the efficiency index for DA and OTC markets in period 4 and over periods 4−6
in the case without shocks (first column) and for the four types of shock.8
Table 5: Efficiency index by treatment and shock.
No Shock D+ D− S+ S−
Periods Periods Periods Periods Periods
4 4− 6 4 4− 6 4 4− 6 4 4− 6 4 4− 6
DA 97.3 96.3 97.2 97.6 92.1 94.7 97.2 98.1 89.4 92.3
OTC 90.3 90.1 97 94.3 91 87.9 98.5 94.5 86.7 88.7
Consider first the DA market. Without shocks, the efficiency index in period 4 is equal to 97.3.
When shocks increasing q∗ are implemented (i.e. D+ and S+) efficiency stays roughly constant in
period 4: for both D+ and S+ the efficiency index is 97.2. However, for shocks decreasing q∗ (i.e.
D− and S−) in period 4 efficiency decreases: it falls to 92.1 for D− and even more sharply (89.4)
8Although efficiency in Periods 1− 3 is an important benchmark to compare efficiency within a given treatment,
we focus here only on efficiency comparison between treatments.
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for S−. Over periods 4− 6, for D+ and S+ efficiency remains high, while for D− and S− it tends
to increase and return to pre-shocks levels.
These findings are in accord with those presented in other studies of DA markets with shocks
(see, e.g., Davis et al., 1993). The temporary efficiency loss provoked in DA markets by shocks D−
and S− may be explained by the fact that both shocks increase the fraction of extra-marginal traders
in the market (D− increases the fraction of extra-marginal sellers while S− increases the fraction of
extra-marginal buyers). This, in turn, increases the probability that extra-marginal traders manage
to exchange with some intra-marginal trader and therefore raises the EM-inefficiency of the DA
mechanism.
In the OTC market we observe a different impact of shocks. In period 4 shocks D+ and S+
sharply raise efficiency: from the baseline of 90.3, in period 4 efficiency reaches 97 under a D+
shock, and 98.1 under a S+ shock. By contrast, efficiency stays almost constant under a D− shock
(91), and decreases under a S− shock (86.7). However, over periods 4− 6 efficiency tends to return
to pre-shocks levels also in the OTC market.
To explain the positive effect of shocks D+ and S+ on the efficiency of the OTC mechanism in
period 4, we analyze in more detail how these shocks affect the traded quantity and the pattern of
closing prices. Table 6 reports the fraction of sessions in which, in period 4, the traded quantity q
in OTC markets is lower, equal or higher than the competitive quantity q∗, both without shocks
(first line) and with the four shocks (lines 2-5).
We note that, in treatments D+ and S+, the fraction of sessions in which q < q∗ drastically
decreases. From a 50% in the control treatment, it drops to 20%, under D+, and to 0%, under S+.
In the previous section we showed that the inefficiency of the OTC mechanism is mainly due the
failure of intra-marginal traders to exchange among themselves, that is, to IM-inefficiency. We also
saw that IM-inefficiency occurs only when q < q∗. Since shocks D+ and S+ drastically reduce the
cases in which q < q∗, we conclude that these shocks also reduce the IM-inefficiency of the OTC
mechanism, thereby raising its overall efficiency.
Table 6: Traded quantity q vs competitive quantity q∗in the OTC market with shocks.
Period 4
q < q∗ q = q∗ q > q∗
No shock 50% 40% 10%
D+ 20% 40% 40%
D− 40% 0% 60%
S+ 0% 20% 80%
S− 80% 0% 20%
There is an additional aspect that should be clarified. The fraction of sessions in which q < q∗,
in period 4, is significantly lower under a S+ shock (0%) than under a D+ shock (20%). To this
phenomenon corresponds the fact that the OTC efficiency raises more significantly as a consequence
of a S+ shock (from 90.3% to 98.5%) than of a D+ shock (from 90.3% to 97%).
The higher efficiency reached in the S+ case can be explained by looking at the pattern of closing
prices in the OTC market. In the previous section we pointed out that in the OTC market closing
prices converge to a price below the competitive price p∗. The fact that a S+ shock reduces p∗
brings the value of p∗ closer to the actual OTC trading prices and thus further raises the efficiency
of this mechanism.
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Figure 3 confirms this intuition. It presents the pattern of closing prices in an OTC market
before and after a S+ shock. The dashed line represents p∗, which in period 4 decreases as a
consequence of S+, while the continuous line represents the average trading price, which before the
shock is below p∗. We see that when p∗ decreases as a consequence of the S+ shock, the distance
between the average trading price and p∗ almost disappears. This corresponds to the fact that after
the shock the fraction of cases in which q is smaller than q∗ goes to zero and the efficiency of the
OTC mechanism increases.
We can sum up our discussion of how the efficiency of the OTC mechanism is affected by shocks
as follows:
Result 2. In the short run, shocks that reduce the competitive quantity do not affect substantially
the efficiency of the OTC mechanism, while they decrease the efficiency of the DA mechanism.
In the short run, shocks that raise the competitive quantity do not affect substantially the effi-
ciency of the DA mechanism, while they significantly increase the efficiency of the OTC mechanism.
This positive effect on the OTC’s efficiency is due to a drop in IM-inefficiency.
In the long run, for all shocks the efficiency of both mechanisms tends to return to pre-shocks
level.
Figure 3: Closing price patterns in an OTC market with S+. The dashed line indicates the equilibrium price. The
continuous line indicates the average exchange price.
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4. Conclusions
Perfectly competitive markets remain a fundamental theoretical benchmark for economists.
Many existing markets, and especially financial markets, display a number of features that char-
acterize competition (many buyers and sellers, who are “small” with respect to the market and
trade a homogeneous commodity) but are not perfectly competitive. For more than half a cen-
tury, experimental economists have studied market institutions that have a perfect-competition
character, and have compared the equilibrium and efficiency properties of these mechanisms to the
competitive benchmark. In particular, experimental economists have focused on double auctions
and other auction mechanisms.
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One key feature of auction mechanisms is that buyers and sellers post their bids and asks pub-
licly. However, in many “almost-competitive” markets, such as those where real estate, currencies,
or bulk commodities are traded, negotiations and transactions occur on a private and typically
bilateral basis rather than through publicly posted bids and asks. In order to clarify how these
markets work, we have designed an over-the-counter mechanism where each agent looks for the
best counterpart through private bids and asks. We have studied experimentally the features and
performance of this mechanism by taking the double-auction mechanism as a benchmark. We found
that the loss of public information that characterizes our OTC market with respect to a DA market
alters the equilibrium properties of the OTC mechanism and reduces its efficiency by about 9%.
From a policy perspective, this result suggests that regulators of financial markets should prefer DA
allocation mechanisms over OTC mechanisms, for the former warrant higher information disclosure
and thus market equilibria that are more consistent with the competitive one.
Recently, some theoretical models of OTC markets have been proposed (see, e.g. Duffie et al.,
2005, 2007). However, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first that investigates OTC
markets from an experimental perspective. Thus there is room for further studies that explore
experimentally the properties of this economically relevant market institution. In a companion
paper (Attanasi et al., 2013), we carry on the analysis of the OTC mechanism by integrating
experimental and computational techniques and bringing into play zero-intelligence agents, that is,
computer automata that post bids and asks at random. In future research, our OTC experimental
design might be applied to the study of markets, such as those discussed by Rust and Hall (2003),
in which agents trade through intermediaries and thus do not have access to public information
about the bids and asks existing in the market.
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